PRELUDE TO THE CONDUCT AND PREPARATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES FOR THE KHARKIV OFFENSIVE OPERATION IN 1942
Abstract
The article discusses the importance of quality planning for a military operation, the shortcomings of the military and political leadership of the Soviet Union during the planning of the offensive operation near Kharkiv in May 1942, and the preconditions that contributed to the defeat of Soviet troops. Planning military operations is an important stage in any military conflict, as a well-planned operation can significantly reduce risks for military personnel and effectively accomplish assigned tasks. The main goal of an offensive operation is victory, which can be achieved with a well-thought-out plan, taking into account possible risks and threats that may arise during its implementation. One of the major advantages of quality planning is that it reduces the costs associated with conducting the operation and decreases the number of casualties among military personnel. Planning also allows reducing the time required to complete the mission and increase the efficiency of the military operation. One of the offensive operations of the Red Army during World War II was the Kharkiv operation in May 1942. Ukraine made a significant contribution to the victory in World War II on the German-Soviet front. Hundreds of thousands of people, both military personnel and civilians, sacrificed their lives in the struggle against Nazi Germany and its allies. It is established that 1942 was a year of many turning points in that war, which had significance for the world and Ukraine in particular. Representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and the Republic of China signed the United Nations Declaration, the counteroffensive of Soviet troops after the battle near Moscow and the debunking of the myth of the invincibility of the German army, the battle for Midway Atoll, the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Attention is focused on the Second Battle of Kharkiv and Operation “Fredericus-1”, which became a significant military operation, and the preconditions that led to the defeat of Soviet troops in that battle. It was found that under the influence of euphoria from the first military victories, the military-political leadership of the Soviet Union was confident in victory over the Wehrmacht troops as early as 1942.
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