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## NEW MOMENTS IN THE TRAGEDY OF JANUARY 20, 1990

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*The article states that the main results of the events that took place in Azerbaijan on the eve of the collapse of the USSR brought our people closer to the restoration of state independence. Revision of every step and event on the way to the restoration of the state independence of Azerbaijan, the creation of appropriate conclusions is of great political importance in terms of determining the prospects for building a democratic state based on the rule of law. The article examines some of the forgotten or little-studied issues of the tragedy of January 20, one of the most influential and tragic events of the last stage on the way to the restoration of the state independence of Azerbaijan, and draw some conclusions. It is argued that the cause and organizer of the tragedy was Moscow, which deprived the leadership of Azerbaijan of any freedom of movement and decision-making. It was especially important for our intelligentsia to raise their voices and sharply criticize the position of the republic and the union leadership in order to expose the excuses and empty words of Moscow in connection with the tragedy of January 20. There is no justification for the shedding of the blood of the Azerbaijani people, an innocent people who have always been known for their national and moral values, but at the same time respected the values of other peoples and did not allow national and religious conflicts and clashes. with other peoples. The bloody massacre of peaceful demonstrators on the night of January 19-20 also left behind the atrocities and crimes committed by the German Nazis against civilians during World War II. Thus, the massacres carried out by order of the leaders of the Soviet empire did not shake the people's determination to fight. Contrary to expectations, dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime began to grow in the republic and beyond. Another lesson of events was that, as in the spring of 1918, the only way to save the people from such and such troubles was to achieve the restoration of state independence.*

**Key words:** *collapse of the USSR, South Caucasus, events of January 20, 1990, political assessment of events, cause-and-effect relationships.*

### **Азизова Рубаба Ясін кизи. Нові моменти трагедії 20 січня 1990 року**

*У статті йдеться про те, що основні підсумки подій, що сталися в Азербайджані напередодні розпаду СРСР, наблизили наш народ до відновлення державної незалежності. Перегляд кожного кроку і події на шляху до відновлення державної незалежності Азербайджану, створення відповідних висновків має велике політичне значення з погляду визначення перспектив побудови демократичної держави, заснованої на верховенстві закону. У статті розглядаються деякі із забутих або маловивчених питань трагедії 20 січня, однієї з найвпливовіших і трагічних подій останнього етапу на шляху відновлення державної незалежності Азербайджану, і робляться деякі висновки. Стверджується, що причиною й організатором трагедії була Москва, що позбавила керівництво Азербайджану будь-якої свободи пересування і прийняття рішень. Нашій інтелігенції було особливо важливо підняти голос і різко критикувати позицію республіки і союзного керівництва, щоб викрити відмовки і порожні слова Москви у зв'язку з трагедією 20 січня. Азербайджанський народ завжди був відомий своїми національно-моральними цінностями, але водночас поважав цінності інших народів і не допускав національних і релігійних конфліктів і зіткнень з іншими народами. Кривава різанина мирних демонстрантів у ніч із 19 на 20 січня також залишила після себе звірства і злочини, вчинені німецькими нацистами проти мирного населення під час Другої світової війни. Таким чином, масові вбивства, здійснені за наказом вождів радянської імперії, не похитнули рішучості народу боротися. Усупереч очікуванням у республіці і за її межами стало наростати невдоволення радянською владою. Інший урок подій полягав у тому, що, як і навесні 1918 р., єдиний спосіб урятувати народ від таких бід – домогтися відновлення державної незалежності.*

**Ключові слова:** *розвал СРСР, Південний Кавказ, події 20 січня 1990 р., політична оцінка подій, причинно-наслідкові зв'язки.*

**Unanswered questions.** There are 31 years between the January 20 tragedy and nowadays. Nonetheless yet we have many unanswered questions relating to the issue. One question which has not been responded definitely is – Was it possible to prevent the tragedy? And these are not all questions. If the tragedy had been prevented how could be assessed possibilities to gain independence, taking into account growing Azeri national movement? Before consideration of the first question we would like to notice that it's necessary to define where the issue was planned and who began first. Because even more important commitment is to investigate how influential was the tragedy tour public, national life and to draw out proper lessons. But we would like to say that it's not possible to answer categorically the questions – who was the guiltiest and how the tragedy



exactly began? But we think that the central power and responsible authorities in Azerbaijan are both under the competence for the tragedy. But in our opinion the central organs, that were more aware about the situation on the eve of the tragedy, were interested in it. And this interest cannot be explained unambiguously.

In this case it is possible to accuse the republican bodies in tardiness, lack of necessary initiative and slow decision-making in existing situation and waiting directions from the central authorities. As we know at the time during just one night approximately 130 Azeri citizens were killed by Soviet soldiers, tanks and personnel carriers. It cannot be forgotten and forgiven. In this view we can answer the second question too. It was possible to change the course of events and to prevent the tragedy. But the matter of fact is that the real powerful force – Moscow – deprived Azerbaijan authorities of any free action-doing and decision-making. On the eve of the tragedy Soviet home minister Bakatin, defense minister Yazov, M.Gorbachev's plenipotentiary emissary Y.Primakov were receiving operative information about the current situation even before coming to Baku.

In this situation it's impossible to express one unanimous opinion about Moscow's motives and interest to create the crisis. In our opinion Kremlin wanted to make itself safe from ever-expanding Azerbaijan national movement and to keep under its control the situation. Probably Moscow wanted to pressure on Azeri public movement and its leaders because it was the real power to prevent ambitions of Armenians to annex Nagorny Karabakh from Azerbaijan and integrate the province into Armenia. Separatist sentiment of Armenian population in Nagorny Karabakh was the main reason of the difficult situation in Azerbaijan.

At another point Kremlin went for these drastic and mean actions in order to punish Azeris for, as if, they "were giving offences" to "poor, submissive" Armenians and prevented failed attempt of secession politics of Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh. Thus Moscow wanted to regain favour of the establishment of Armenia.

It seems that these two factors played significant roles in the development of the crisis. But the first variant was more probable and expectable. Because favour that had been showing by Kremlin to Armenia's leaders and nationalists since February 1988, gave them now an opportunity to reach many of their aims.

**Conclusions about the reasons of the tragedy.** If even the tragedy had been prevented, it's necessary to notice that our conclusions are not definite.

If only the tragedy had been avoided and innocent people were not killed ... The national movement since the last months of 1989 now increased in activity, people claimed for sovereignty, there were 3 appeals for independence. All these indicated that Azeri public movement was taking shape of national-liberation character.

If the tragedy had not happened, the national-liberation movement, as a logical result and continuation of the social processes during previous years would have finished already. It's possible that restoration of Azerbaijan independence could take place a little earlier or a little later. But it was expectable. Even before these events Azerbaijan Republic was in the forefront of the struggle for national-liberation and sovereignty among Soviet Union republics. The consequences of January 20 tragedies just influenced the events in the same vein but now with quicker continuation. One should not miss the fact that a Constitutional Law "about sovereignty of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic" was adopted as early as in September 23, 1989 during the unscheduled session of Azerbaijan Supreme Council [2, p. 25].

This law was the first one of such type in USSR and it very much resonated in the Soviet Union and in the world. Tracking back attentively the events and processes which had been taking place since the last two months of 1989 until the midst of January 1990 before the tragedy of January 20, also helps us to clarify the issues that have been debated above.

Some authors think that since autumn 1989 propagandistic activities of ANF (Azerbaijan National Front) were influencing to appointments of personnel to the senior positions of executive agencies in the countryside regions and to personnel appointments in other governing bodies (and some similar facts) which indicated that national movement was gradually increasing.

It's not a secret that during previous years of Soviet power Soviet army kept watchful guard over the boundaries of Azerbaijan with neighbor countries - Iran Islamic Republic and Turkey. But in autumn 1989 these two boundary lines suddenly became "without surveillance", inhabitants of the border territories began to destroy border barbed-wire fences and to cross the border lines. Soviet border guards did not react to these unpermitted crossings. It would be too naively to believe that it was purely coincidental.

Besides in October 18, 1991 Azerbaijan authorities signed into law the Constitutional Act about restoration of state independence [1], thus in this point Azerbaijan also was in the lead amongst other Soviet republics and this commendable action was another evidence of our purposefulness and precedence that made us proud.

According to the data of the population census 1989, in the province the Armenians made up 77%, the Azeris were 21.2%, other ethnicities – 1.6%. 10 years before in 1979 the figures of the census were accordingly: Armenians – 75.9%, Azeris – 23% [8, p.199]. It demonstrated that due to the politics of Armenian leaders in Nagorny Karabakh the number of Azeris decreased but the number of Armenians increased.



**Moscow's policy stance.** At the time M. Gorbachov speaking in the Supreme Soviet, expressed political assessment of Sumgait dramatic events in February 1988 and said that the main reason of that tragedy was as if slow reaction to restore order of the local militia and military troops deployed around the city [6, p.76]. We have to note that M. Gorbachov repeated the same hypocrisy, speaking about the drama of January 20, 1990.

It's necessary to note that even on January 15 just one Gorbachov's directive was enough to prevent dangerous development of the situation in Baku. Because that day there were enough internal troops of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the USSR in Baku which were able to stabilize the situation, and they were expecting a directive. But the directive was not given to them but a paratrooper DLU was brought to the city.

In the evening of January 19 in the building of republican Ministry for Internal Affairs, in disregard of numerous promises of three Soviet Union ministers, it was announced that "Mikhail Gorbachov without consent of Azerbaijan Supreme Council since 00 time of January 20 signed an ordinance "about imposition of the state of emergency in Baku" [10, p.82].

There are quite a few obscure points concerning imposition of the state of emergency. Firstly, as it was declared by Kremlin that Soviet troops entered Baku as if after invitation of Azerbaijan authorities. These Kremlin's hoax proved to be fictitious. Second point is there had to be at least several days in advance preannouncement before Gorbachov's ordinance was put into force as it typical to such cases.

This common procedure was intentionally neglected. Another important point was that after announcement of the ordinance and its implementation just in few hours Soviet authorities undertook various subversive measures to hide rapid carrying into effect the ordinance the 4<sup>th</sup> point. After some time after the tragedy Soviet ministers who were guilty of the massacre and whose names were mentioned above, they fabricated fraudulent news to justify Gorbachov's bloody crime.

But along with that, during some eighteen months when Armenian extremists in Armenia and Nagorny-Karabakh committed numerous crimes and were killing, maiming, expelling Azeris, Soviet mass media kept silence. It's enough to mention the report that "only in 1989 Armenian nationalists committed more than 30 subversive destructions or violence, more than 350 times attacked automobile caravans with Azeris, and more than 900 Russian soldiers were wounded by Armenians during their military service" [7, p. 242].

The activities of Special Control Committee in the province were stopped. After initial acts of the Organizational Committee more than one thousand armed Armenians did not disarm but Russian forces did nothing to disarm them. In its turn this resulted with bloody events.

Before January tragedy in Baku, in Armenia T. Petrosyan (the first president of Armenian Republic) was one of the leaders among those who were speaking nationalistic demands for election of a chairman of Armenian Supreme Council, for gaining sovereignty, for integration of Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia etc. But Soviet Union authorities did not stop these anti-Soviet, nationalistic demonstrations. Quite opposite, in cases when numerous crimes of Armenian extremists were confirmed, Soviet authorities usually were performing policy of "equal blaming of both sides".

Along with that the processes taken place in Azerbaijan Soviet Republic during 1989 and especially within first ten days of 1990, the reasons that forced people to political demonstrations were not defined correctly but instead Azeri national movement was libeled as "anti-Soviet, Pan-Turkist, Islamist, nationalistic etc". This policy could not pacify tensions in Azerbaijan and in its capital city.

**Unclear points of the tragedy.** Outside Azerbaijan many well-known Soviet Union's politicians, journalists, State figures protested against Soviet Army's invasion in Baku, carnage of civilians, including children and women. At the time B. Yeltsin (future president of Russian Federation), being an official visitor in Japan, sent a telegram to Gorbachov, blaming his order to invade in Baku as the anti-constitutional one. When after the slaughter in Baku a book "Black January. Documents and facts" was presented to Yeltsin, he said – "At the next session we'll try to remove marshal Yazov from the post and we'll demand to bring him to justice for innocent victims who were killed" [9, p. 63].

We noted that tragedy January 20 could be prevented. There were a lot of opinions, criticisms, and proposals on the eve of the catastrophe. Even on January 13 local authorities were operatively informed about possibility of dangerous evolution of the situation. Mr. V. Huseynov, who at the time was a chairman of the State Security Committee, was asked by a journalist – "Was the Committee aware about possible massive offences against law, robberies etc.?" Surprisingly he responded affirmatively and said that their Committee did not make any decision during those events. In other words those days not Baku but directly Moscow decided what to do. "The "triumvirate" in Baku was just simply performing Moscow's will" [9, p. 68].

At the time one of the authors who were spreading information via Russian mass media, was famous filmmaker S. Govorukhin. He said that he was surprised, seeing negligent attitude of Moscow leaders and their representatives in Baku not long before the tragedy. It is another proof of the above-mentioned ideas. Govorukhin



informed that “Internal troops were involved only after completion of the events. When Soviet generals were asked – Why Internal troops were not involved in time? – They answered that as if “on the eve of the events demonstrators of the political meetings blocked all exit roads for military vehicles and troops” [9, p. 65]. But this response was just ridiculous absurdity. If it were true why then troops were able to exit in the night between January 19 and 20 and committed massive killing? Those days’ activities of Moscow’s official “triumvirate” in Baku were at least incomprehensible, unexpected and unwanted.

If in Baku the houses inhabited by the Armenians were being robbed since January 5 until January 13-14, and then peaceful demonstrations began, id est. the peak of the events was over; it means that there was no necessity to announce imposition of the state of emergency in Baku.

For that reason on January 22, 1990 Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council accepted a legal act stating that “About the Decision to terminate the State of Emergency in Baku. The ordinance of the USSR Supreme Council’s senior leaders “about imposition of the state of emergency in Baku dated January 19, 1990, was the act of aggression against sovereignty of Azerbaijan SSR that resulted with hundreds of killed and wounded people in Baku and its suburbs. We define this ordinance of the USSR leading organs and actions of persons in high position as a crime against Azerbaijani nation” [2, p.132].

In the Clause 7 of the above-mentioned ordinance was stated about offences against law. But those offences were stopped by Security Forces, activists of ANF (Azerbaijan National Front) and ordinary citizens. Baku streets became relatively orderly and peaceful but demonstrates were staying in the streets and squares which indicated that tense atmosphere was still continuing.

**Republican authorities on the eve of the tragedy.** It’s not correct to find reasons of republican leaders’ inactivity, paralysis of their functions on the eve of catastrophe only during those dramatic days.

There were thousands of Azeri refugees in Baku who had been violently deported from Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh, lost their relatives; they were deprived of their houses and properties. Unfortunately we have to admit that this factor to some extent negatively contributed to lawless deeds and illegality, and even there were efforts to counteract influence of national movement leaders.

But it is just one factor. Before the events republican bodies were giving different promises to these fugitives. But in reality the situation was not going to be stabilized soon. And the refugees understood that and it infuriated them. It’s not difficult to understand that all these worsened criminal situation. During previous months republican government and local executive authorities were inactive, they did not implement their promises and therefore the masses of people had lost confidence in them that partly influenced to the course of events. Exactly this collapse in confidence, escalation of displeasure with official organs, beginning since the end of 1989, we have to confess that, was the reason for new massive protests and lawless actions. Those days in some regions protestors forced leaders of local executive organs to resign from their positions and there were numerous acts of rebellion that afforded official leaders opportunities pretend to struggle against disobedience and make binding decisions.

Since December 8, 1989 back-to-back meetings, strikes began in Jalilabad town. Members of administrative organs did not use weapons against people but joined the rebellion. On December 29 “people’s government” started here. Provisional organizational committee and National defense council were created [3]. Soon similar events began in other regions. By the way, republican government in order to substantiate its weakness used different arguments. One of them was that as if ANF, national movement in general, meetings, strikes etc. did not give a chance to solve social and economic problems. It was baseless statement. Of course this attitude besides being unfair, neglected unanimity of people and authorities which was absolutely necessary not only to solve Karabakh problem but also other big and small problems. This position of the government agencies was increasing popular discontent, was leading to disbelief of nation to the organs of power. All these meant that attempts to suppress people’s movement could almost deadlock already complicated situation.

**Attitude of our intellectuals on the eve of the tragedy.** It has to be specially noted that Azerbaijani intellectuals actively spoke out against Kremlin’s fraudulent pretence and unmasked its inventions. They harshly criticized standpoints of republican and Soviet Union’s leaders before and after January 20. We would like to stress one of them. One of the activists of the national movement, a deputy of several sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR writer Anar put a direct question to Gorbachov that proved exactly Moscow’s guilt of the drama.

Anar asked, “Even according to exaggerated official reports, in January the number of mob members who were robbing Armenian apartments, was approximately 5 thousand. Why then during the robberies Internal Troops deployed in Baku were doing nothing to prevent the outrages?” [9, p. 65]. It was surprising but Gorbachov in front of the audience turned his head aside without answer.

We have been discussing up to nowadays the shadowy issues related to January 20. In our opinion in January ANF activists, our intellectuals who estimated the situation objectively, in no case could imagine that political atmosphere would critically aggravate and would continue with an unexpectable scenario.



For unknown reasons one delicate issue is left out of consideration and it helps Soviet official authorities to lay the blame for the tragedy on ANF which had influence on national movement and was able enough to direct people masses.

For comparison sake we'd like to say that in terms of a good organization, essence of claimed demands, motivating force, Azerbaijan national movement outperformed Baltic republics. Soon after amidst people masses slogans to achieve restoration of national independence were being appealed more and more often.

Azeri people claimed for termination of Armenian unsanctioned actions, arrogation and crimes, to restore sovereign rights of Azerbaijan for Karabakh province, strengthening of legality. These claims attracted more attention of the public.

Another different aspect was that at the meetings and demonstrations they often demanded to solve the problem of refugees. It meant that all political participants tried as they could to use the refugee factor in order to substantiate and consolidate their political influence and to achieve their goals.

**“The third force” factor.** At the same time it was not correct not to take into account or to underestimate some political groups, organizations both in Azerbaijan and abroad which intended to destabilize social-political situation in the republic and thus to derive benefits for their personal careers growth and for other purposes.

If it had not been so, then the main citizen power – Azeri refugees, who were exiled from Armenia, many times offended and insulted, would have not had the prepared lists of addresses of apartments inhabited by the Armenians. This fact is another proof that besides different social groups, the activists of national movement and official authorities which took a laissez-faire attitude during the events, there was a third power that incentivized the development of the situation to be directed to unwanted, dangerous direction. Who were members of that third force, who controlled them? These enigmas have not been completely revealed up to now. Obviously the answers for these questions may be found in secret documents in archives in Moscow and republican State Security Committee (SSC).

When ANF came to power and reigned in 1992-1993 in order to disclose this and other enigmatic cases there were public debates with inquiries to declassify SSC archives, but soon after the declassification was declared inexpedient and was forgotten.

We must not forget about provocative role of shameful proclamation of Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on December 1, 1989 about annexation.

**Events after the tragedy.** Azerbaijan people never protested against Soviet legislation, ideology and system. Our compatriots only demanded for restitution of their territorial integrity, sovereignty, constitutional rights and they were absolutely dangerous for Kremlin. Therefore we'd like to say that Moscow had neither legitimate nor moral rights to so atrociously subjugate people, inflicting terrible bloodshed.

For centuries Azeris had reputation of a nation with high moral character and at the same time we respected high moral values of other nations, we prevented inter-ethnic or inter-religious confrontation and discrimination of ethnicities living in our territory. That's why this Kremlin's horrible crime against innocent Azeri citizens in no case can be justified.

That infamous crackdown of Soviet troops on peaceful demonstrators during the night on January 19-20 put into the shade even notorious atrocities of German fascists on peaceful population during WW II.

Naturally, this criminal treatment of the whole Azeri nation triggered indignation in Azerbaijan society against hypocrisy of Soviet leaders, Soviet leadership system, false Soviet propagandistic ideology and impeded rehabilitation of social legality and tranquility. Exactly for this reason the national movement within just several days renovated with new content and particular nature, and it prepared a basis for transformation of public demands and protest rallies into national liberation movement.

The leaders of the Soviet Union even after the drama were trying to distort the truth and to deceive the Union public with fraudulent propaganda. Some ideologists in order to give veneer of legality to Moscow's violent actions, in print media, on television began active and false accusation of Azeris, labelled the demonstrators as the extremists, criminals etc. One of the Armenians' "trustworthy servants" G. Starovoytova's article, published in the newspaper "Moskovskiye novosti", is a proof to our ideas [9, p. 66].

We think that in each case the orchestrators of January events were outside Azerbaijan but the performers of their plans were in our republic. Exactly those persons could skillfully use the resentment of the refugee masses. And it could be probably predictable.

**Resonance of the tragedy.** One of the most mass-circulation newspapers of the former USSR in Moscow "Pravda", during those dramatic days published an article written by special correspondents A. Gorokhov and V. Onulov, who stated that, "Azeri refugees from Armenia were the main participants of the violence taken place on January 13-14 in Baku. The problems of their difficult social conditions and impoverished welfare played a specific role in the oncoming events" [10, p. 238].



It's also possible to define January 20 events as very dissatisfied Kremlin's attempt of the crackdown on the national movement which was being gradually radicalized and they chanted slogans for restitution of national sovereign rights and other different claims. Those days the activists of the national movement, in spite of different defamation and libels about them, managed to prevent intentional plans to exacerbate the situation, to find a pretext for onslaught on the members of the national movement, to provoke numerous incidents and altercations, or they informed competent organs about these plans. Seeing that situation in Baku was close to a social eruption, the leaders of the national movement proposed to organize a special volunteer assistance that once again demonstrated their intention to stabilize the situation. "The National Defense Committee created on January 12 and consisted of the activists of the national movement, aimed to assist the security organs to restore the public tranquility" [9, p. 68].

On January 17 the leaders of the national movement had direct dialogue with the "triumvirate" and achieved their promise not to send troops in Baku if public order and tranquility would be restored, but then this promise was broken and those dramatic events happened.

We have to note that since the beginning of the Nagorny Karabakh crisis, absence along with people of such a skillful, indispensable politician and national leader as H. Aliyev who put Azerbaijan interests above all and proving that with his practical activities, was one of the reasons which resulted with the undesirable development of the political processes and finally with the drama of January 20.

After the tragedy on January 21, 1990 H. Aliyev came to Azerbaijan diplomatic mission in Moscow and in his declaration accused M. Gorbachov in wrong planning and implementation of ethnic policy. In the declaration he stated about, "unmasking the bloody action of the red regime in our country" [5, p. 128] and made a start of the last stage, leading to our national independence.

We would like to draw attention to one remarkable point that shows the greatness of soul of Azerbaijan nation and moral unity. Funeral of 130 victims of the carnage in the Cemetery of Honour and then mourning for 40 days once again proved to the world that even during the woeful days our people can demonstrate their moral virtues. In Azerbaijan all factories, manufacturing plants, educational centers temporarily stopped their activities. Despite Kremlin's all efforts even in oil-fields productive activities were stopped, although it was considered impermissible. All those events showed that Moscow did not reach its goals, even though it had created the bloodbath.

That henceforth forced Moscow to treat Azerbaijan more carefully, to accept majority of people's demands put forward during the meetings and demonstrations. Accordingly A. Vezirov who was the official leader of Azerbaijan government, was removed from his post. But Kremlin was its usual self and secured the highest government position for A. Mutalibov who was politically loyal to Moscow and was considered as an economic executive.

**About some results of the tragedy.** Generally speaking, the fight for freedom that our nation has been struggling for several centuries, and in the second half of 1980s turned into critically important and responsible struggle for liberty and independence, began so dramatically. As we mentioned, Kremlin's plans to crack down on the national movement fell short. Perpetration of the massacre was severely criticized in mass media across all the USSR. In "Pravda" newspaper on January 22, 1990 the article was published where they stated, "As the result of measures taken in order to declare the state of emergency, as if women and children were killed. These statements are clear-cut provocation. We have to repeat again that it is deliberate falsehood. Its aim is to confront people and the army and law-enforcement authorities".

So the slaughter directly commanded by the leaders of Soviet Empire was not able to subvert determination of our people. Quite the opposite, in Azerbaijan and beyond its borders grievances against the Soviet regime began to increase.

After the tragedy the instructive lesson as the similar one in spring of 1918 was the following – to avoid this and possible future afflictions, our nation had just one way – to restore its independence.

Baku tragedy in January 20, 1990 was continuation of mean, criminal policy of the Soviet Empire as it was in Alma-Ata, Tbilisi, Vilnius cities. The entire world saw that Soviet Empire took a hard line against national liberation movements. It was contrary to Gorbachev's announcement of "perestroika", "glasnost" and political reforms. We must especially stress the incentive impulse of H. Aliyev's ideas in his Moscow declaration for the national liberation movement. In this declaration the reasons of the drama were analyzed and given the political assessment that, "the tragedy happened due to equal guilt of Moscow and republican leaders and it was a political blunder" [5, p. 128].

Kremlin was the organizer and initiator of this barbaric onslaught of Azeris in January 20. Among the Soviet soldiers who attacked Baku there was quite a few of Armenians who were preliminary trained. These Soviet Armenian soldiers were conscripted in Russian provinces of Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov [4, p. 113].



### Conclusion

The world we live in, the events happening in vicinity and far away from our borders show us that some threats for our state independence still remain, some new menaces arise. It makes us attentively observe, take all factors into consideration and analyze existing realities. About 3 thousand casualties among our soldiers and civilians who were killed during 44 days lasting National Patriotic War for restoration of our territorial integrity, once again showed us tremendous difficulties of our victory. The way that has been leading us during for more than 30 years for restoration of our national independence and territorial integrity and intense political struggle taught us an important lesson to be day and night vigilant, to try to predict and prevent any possible dangers and potential hazards.

At the same time the very process that we've discussed and learning from experience once again shows that all attempts against our nationhood and sovereignty can be prevented only if our people, independently of one's social status, profession, ethnicity, will be able to unite behind the idea of supremacy of our national interests, inviolability of our independence.

The tragedy of January 20, 1990 and the recent victory in the 44 days National Patriotic War convincingly demonstrated that we have to upscale our efforts to disclose our point of view, truth about Azerbaijan to the world public.

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