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**IMPACT OF EVENTS IN UKRAINE ON RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS (2004–2014)**

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*The article describes how the events that took place in Ukraine in 2004–2018 influenced the relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland. The author notes that since the beginning of the new millennium, a new stage begins in Russian-Polish relations associated with changes both in the internal political life of Russia and Poland's accession to NATO in the spring of 1999. In 2000–2003, there was a warming in relations between the two states, leading to begin a high-level political dialogue. However, the “warming” in interstate relations did not last long – already in November 2004, the “first cooling” was felt in Russian-Polish relations, which was associated with the events in neighboring Ukraine.*

*It is known that in November 2004, the presidential elections were held in Ukraine, in which the main struggle was between the supporter of the pro-Western path of development of Ukraine V. Yushchenko and the pro-Russian V. Yanukovich. The fact is that in 2004 Poland supported the Ukrainian “orange revolution” and Polish politicians played a significant role in the victory of V. Yushchenko at that time. However, later on in relation to Poland, the pro-Western V. Yushchenko's rhetoric had changed. All this cast a shadow on his pre-election promise “rapprochement with Poland”. In the next elections, V. Yushchenko lost the support of Poland.*

*In the background of the Yushchenko's defeat in the 2010 presidential elections, Russia and Poland began another “warming” of relations, but it did not last long. In connection with the events in Ukraine, which began in the fall of 2013, relations between the states deteriorated again. The Polish state and Polish society supported Euromaidan. Relations especially deteriorated after March 2014, when Russia, violating all international legal norms, seized the Crimean Republic, regions of Donetsk and Lugansk under the guise of volunteers.*

*Beginning in the spring of 2014, the Cold War began in relations between Russia and Poland, including Russia and the European Union, and continues to this day. The Polish side considers it possible to return to normal relations only if Russia renounces its aggressive policy against Ukraine, withdraws its military formations from Donbass and Luhansk, and returns Crimea to Ukraine.*

**Key words:** Ukraine, “orange revolution”, Poland, “cold war”, Russia, Smolensk tragedy.

**Тадждехібонаб Мехпара Каміль кизи. Вплив подій в Україні на російсько-польські відносини (2004–2014)**

*У статті йдеться про те, як події, які відбулися на Україні в 2004–2014 роках, вплинули на відносини між Російською Федерацією та Республікою Польща. Автор зазначає, що з початку нового тисячоліття в російсько-польських відносинах починається новий етап, що було пов'язано як зі змінами у внутрішньополітичному житті Росії, так і з вступом Польщі навесні 1999 року в НАТО. У 2000–2003 роках у взаєминах двох держав спостерігалось «потепління», почався політичний діалог на вищому рівні. Однак «потепління» в міждержавних відносинах довго не тривало – вже в листопаді 2004 року в російсько-польських відносинах відчувалося «перше похолодання», що було пов'язано з подіями в сусідній Україні.*

*Відомо, що в листопаді 2004 року в Україні відбулися президентські вибори, на яких основна боротьба йшла між прихильником прозахідного шляху розвитку України В. Ющенком та проросійським В. Януковичем. У 2004 році Польща підтримувала українську «помаранчеву революцію», і в перемозі В. Ющенко тоді польські політики грали значущу роль. Позиція Польщі не сподобалася Росії, і В. Путін звинуватив А. Квасневського у втручанні у внутрішні справи інших країн. Однак надалі щодо Польщі у прозахідного В. Ющенко риторика змінилася. Все це кинуло тінь на його передвиборчу обіцянку «зближення з Польщею». На чергових виборах у 2010 році В. Ющенко позбувся підтримки Польщі.*

*На тлі поразки В. Ющенко на президентських виборах у 2010 році в стосунках між Росією та Польщею почалося чергове «потепління» відносин, проте воно довго не тривало. У зв'язку з подіями в Україні, що почалися з осені 2013 року, відносини між двома державами знову зіпсувалися. Польська держава і польське суспільство підтримували Євромайдан. Відносини між Росією і Польщею особливо зіпсувалися після березня 2014 року, коли Росія, зневажаючи всі міжнародні правові норми, захопила Кримську республіку, під прикриттям добровольців в українські області, Донецьк і Луганськ були введені російські збройні сили.*

*Починаючи з весни 2014 року в стосунках між Росією і Польщею, в тому числі Росії з Європейським Союзом почалася «холодна війна», яка триває до сьогоднішнього дня. Польська сторона вважає за можливе повернення до нормальних відносин, якщо Росія відречеться від агресивної політики проти України, виведе свої військові формування з Донбасу і Луганська і поверне Крим Україні.*

**Ключові слова:** Україна, «помаранчева революція», Польща, «холодна війна», Росія, Смоленська трагедія.



Since the beginning of the new millennium, a new stage begins in Russian-Polish relations associated with changes both in the internal political life of Russia and Poland's accession to NATO in the spring of 1999. In 2000–2003, there was a warming in relations between the two states, leading to begin a high-level political dialogue. The President of Poland A. Kwasniewski visited Russia in October 2001 which followed by the return visit of the President of Russia V.V. Putin to Poland in January 2002. [16]. Some political observers started talking about personal friendship between the presidents of Russia and Poland after these visits. However, the “warming” relations of two countries based on the personal friendship of A. Kwasniewski and V. Putin did not last long – already in November 2004, the first “cooling” was felt in Russian-Polish relations, which was due to the reaction of the Polish government and society to the events taking place in Ukraine at those times.

It is known that in November 2004, the presidential elections were held in Ukraine, in which the main struggle was between the supporter of the pro-Western path of development of Ukraine V. Yushchenko and the pro-Russian V. Yanukovich. On November 21, 2004, the CEC of Ukraine announced the preliminary results of the second round of the presidential elections where V. Yanukovich allegedly won by an advantage of 3%. The majority of foreign observers and supporters of V. Yushchenko believed that Yanukovich's advantage was achieved due to numerous violations during the voting and they gave a start to mass protests that lasted until January 23, 2005. The popular movement which lasted 2 months went down in history as the “Orange Revolution” [18].

In Russia, where the candidacy of V. Yanukovich was supported, the Ukrainian “orange revolution” was met with disapproval, believing that the “orange revolution” was essentially directed against the national interests of Russia [1, p. 29]. Events in Ukraine attracted a great interest from the Polish president Kwasniewski and the entire political elite of the country. In Poland, it was believed that the victory of V. Yushenko in the elections would bring Ukraine one more step closer to Europe and a democratic, pro-Western Ukraine in the future would become an obstacle to Russia's imperial ambitions.

In the confrontation between Yushenko and Yanukovich, Poland supported a compromise option – to repeat presidential election, which was won by V. Yushenko. Russia did not like Poland's position, and V. Putin accused A. Kwasniewski of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries [1, p. 30]. In this way, Russia demonstrated its ambitions for the post-Soviet region, considering it exclusively its own sphere of influence. And Poland, by its attitude to the Ukrainian revolution, showed that Poland no longer sees Ukraine as a means of achieving a political goal but as a future partner in NATO and the European Union, who will protect both Poland and the European Community from Russia's imperial ambitions.

Since autumn 2004, in the background of the events, relations between Russia and Poland have become “cooler”. The political leaders of both states began to ignore each other. Polish President A. Kwasniewski refused to take part in the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the Victory over fascism, which took place in May 2005 in Moscow. Russian diplomacy was also not eager to improve relations with Poland, since in the same year A. Kwasniewski was not invited to the celebrations of the 750th anniversary of the founding of the city of Kaliningrad. In our opinion, the hardening of A. Kwasniewski's position was associated with the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland – A. Kwasniewski wanted to appear anti-Russian in the eyes of his political opponents in order to soften their criticism.

In the summer of 2005, neither the Russian nor the Polish side took any steps to improve mutual relations. In September 25, 2005, the Law and Justice party, known for its anti-Russian position, won the parliamentary elections in Poland. Following this, L. Kaczynski from the national - conservatives won the presidential elections held on October 23 of the same year. The attitude towards the results of both parliamentary and presidential elections was negative in Russia [2, p. 7]. As expected, relations between two countries have deteriorated. In our opinion, both sides were to blame for the worsening of relations. The Polish leadership returned to “historical politics” [1, p. 30], another wave of accusations began against Russia for the committing of the Katyn tragedy and political repression against the Polish people began. In response, Russia adopted a series of economic sanctions against Poland including embargo on food imported from Poland. Another step was followed by Poland: the Polish leadership spoke out negatively about the transportation of Russian gas by the Baltic pipeline through Poland [1, p. 30].

In the first months of L. Kaczynski's presidency, no drastic steps were taken towards Russia. In our opinion, this is the result of the activities of the former Polish Ambassador to Russia, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland S. Miller. However, in May 2005 he was replaced with Hanna Fotyga, a close figure to L. Kaczynski. Her appointment put an end to the differences in the government's foreign policy. And after the appointment of J. Kaczynski, the brother of the President of Poland, as Prime Minister of Poland, all power was concentrated in one hands. There have been significant changes in all spheres of life, including in foreign policy, leading to the fact that Poland has been pursuing a policy of adapting to the Western community in the past 15 years.



And the time has already come when Poland has to say its own word on many issues of international affairs, including relations with NATO and European Union countries, as well as Eastern Europe. Poland tried to intensify its “eastern policy” within the EU, and while guided by the Getroyd-Meroshevsky doctrine.

Based on this doctrine, Poland tried to develop relations primarily with such Eastern European countries as Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Supporting these countries, Poland pursued the following goals: to create a buffer zone with Russia and to free itself from the role of a “front-line state”, and also to help these states integrate into NATO and the EU. For Poland, the admission of Ukraine to the EU and NATO was also important in a sense that it would not give France and Germany the opportunity to become superpowers within the EU. A strong Russia with imperial ambitions posed a danger to the existence of the Polish state, and therefore Poland was ready to sacrifice relations with Russia for the sake of rapprochement of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and other countries of Eastern Europe with European institutions.

Poland's negative attitude towards Russia led Russia to begin to treat Poland as a secondary country. This was clearly manifested during the meeting of the EU leaders in the Finnish city of Lahti in October 2006, where Russian President Vladimir Putin was also invited. As L. Kaczynski did not try to meet with V. Putin, he clearly ignored him, considering the meeting with him not important [12, p. 23]. It should be noted that the cold relations between the leaders of Poland and Russia influenced the political establishment, but most of the society in both countries had good relations with each other. For example, a public poll conducted in 2005 in Poland showed that 67% of respondents were in favor of establishing good-neighborly relations with Russia. Only 22% believed that it was impossible to establish good relations with Russia [12, p. 24].

In 2007, parliamentary elections were held in Poland, and the Civic Platform party led by D. Tusk won the elections. This party was distinguished by its loyal attitude towards Russia. After that, the foreign policy sphere became the arena of political struggle between L. Kaczynski and D. Tusk.

D. Tusk's government had revised its foreign policy towards Russia. Firstly, Poland began to develop relations with Russia through European structures. Secondly, the government of D. Tusk made compromises with Russia on some economic issues. The Polish government also supported the proposal to abolish the visa regime between Russia and the European Union. However, the Polish presidential power pursued a line of “historical policy” with Russia, continued to accuse it of all crimes against the Polish people once perpetrated by Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. To solve the historical problems that arose in October 2008, within the framework of an intergovernmental agreement, a Polish-Russian working group on controversial issues was created. The leaders of the group were appointed: from the Polish side, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, and from the Russian side, Anatoly Torkunov [11].

Since August 2008, relations between Russia and Poland have worsened again, which was associated with the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war. After the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, at the initiative of Poland and Sweden, the EU Eastern Partnership program was developed and adopted, which in short timing has become one of the elements of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe.

In May 2009, the founding summit of the Eastern Partnership was held in Prague. However, Russia's attitude towards this program remained negative. This attitude was once again demonstrated during the Russia-European Union summit that took place in May 2009 in Khabarovsk, where Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed his concerns about the goals of the Eastern Partnership. The second Eastern Partnership summit took place in 2011 already in Warsaw. This time, the reaction of Russia was not so harsh – the chairman of the Federation Council of Russia K. Kosachev, in threatening notes, called on the EU to abandon its rivalry with Russia in the post-Soviet region. [10]. Despite all this, the eastern direction will remain one of the main directions in Poland's foreign policy for a long time, which makes Russian – Polish rivalry in this region inevitable in the future.

After the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, radicalization of even the most moderate Polish politicians was observed, including D. Tusk, who raised the question of Georgia's early admission to NATO before the EU. Poland has approved the deployment of American PRO systems on its territory, citing the need to protect themselves from possible aggression from Russia. In 2008, B. Obama won the US presidential election, and relations with Russia were revised. Through the efforts of H. Clinton, the Russian – American rapprochement began. In the context of the this rapprochement, Poland was also forced to change its behavior towards Russia. In addition, the events that took place in the political life of Russia also inspired hope for an improvement in relations: in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev became president of Russia, who announced the need to modernize the country, which required cooperation with the West. In addition, on April 7, 2010, Prime Ministers of Russia and Poland V. Putin and D. Tusk met in Smolensk and honored the memory of the victims of the Katyn tragedy, where V. Putin noted in his speech that the culprit of this tragedy was not the Russian people, but the Stalinist regime [15]. Putin's speech created a positive psychological atmosphere for improving relations.



Three days after the meeting of the prime ministers, on April 10, 2010, the plane of the President of Poland crashed near Smolensk. President L. Kaczynski himself and 94 other Polish politicians were on board. This tragic event affected Russian-Polish relations in two ways: on the one hand, a rapprochement of positions was outlined. Even the Polish political leaders B. Komarovsky and V. Jaruzelsky took part in the military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2010. On the other hand, anti-Russian propaganda began in Polish society, initiated by the Law and Justice Party. Supporters of this party accused Russia and the leaders of the Civic Platform party in the murder of L. Kaczynski and Polish politicians [13].

The anti-Russian propaganda of the Law and Justice party did not significantly change the political atmosphere. Since the spring of 2010, such important events have taken place in relations, which made it possible to speak of the end of the period of lethargy. In the same year, another event took place that contributed, not surprisingly, to the rapprochement of the positions of Russia and Poland – this is the victory of the pro-Russian V. Yanukovych in the presidential elections. The fact is that in 2004 Poland supported the Ukrainian “orange revolution” and Polish politicians played a significant role in the victory of V. Yushchenko at that time. However, later on in relation to Poland, the pro-Western V. Yushchenko’s rhetoric had changed. All this cast a shadow on his pre-election promise “rapprochement with Poland” [1, p.30]. In the next elections, V. Yushchenko lost the support of Poland.

In the background of the Yushchenko’s defeat in the 2010 presidential elections, Russia and Poland began another “warming” of relations, but it did not last long. In connection with the events in Ukraine, which began in the fall of 2013, relations between the states deteriorated again. The Polish state and Polish society supported Euromaidan, and on November 11, 2013, a group of people from Polish nationalists attacked the Russian embassy in Warsaw for protest. In response, the Polish embassy in Moscow was attacked by members of the Other Russia radical party [14]. Relations especially deteriorated after March 2014, when Russia, violating all international legal norms, seized the Crimean Republic, regions of Donetsk and Lugansk under the guise of volunteers. The illegal seizure of these territories from Ukraine then began. The Russian side justified its aggressive actions under the pretext of protecting the Russian population of the named subjects of Ukraine, but in fact, its aggression against Ukraine was a response to the latter’s desire to integrate into the European Community and the coming to power of Western-oriented politicians.[17, p. 46].

Since the spring of 2014, a “cold war” began in relations between Russia and Poland, including Russia and the European Union, which continues to this day, although the Russian side does not consider it a cold war, but assesses it as a manifestation of interstate contradictions [3]. After Russia’s military aggression against the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the forcible annexation of the Crimean peninsula to Russia, Poland decided to support Western sanctions against Russia and freeze political dialogue [3].

Poland not only supports Western sanctions against Russia, but also actively promotes the idea of the need to apply these sanctions against the aggressor state.

In 2015, the confrontation between Russia and Poland reached a climax: the announcement of 2015 as the Year of Russia in Poland was canceled. In February 2015 in Kalisz, Lyubasha, in September in Szczecin, in November – in Mielec, actions were organized against the monuments of the Red Army (5). In 2016, similar protests were also held in Warsaw, Sianoka, Poznan, Kielce, Makow, Stargrad, Landsut and in other cities of Poland.[6]. On June 22, 2017, the Sejm of Poland adopted some changes to the law banning the propaganda of communism and other totalitarian regimes, and the decision of the Sejm was approved by the President of Poland on the same day. According to the adopted changes, the monuments of the Red Army in Poland were to be dismantled [4]. During 2017, actions against monuments to Soviet soldiers continued in such cities of Poland as Gniezno, Zabrze, Trzchanka, Warsaw, Olsztin, Strzegom, Zamoć, etc. [8]. The Russian side blamed the media and the political leadership of Poland for all these actions against monuments of Soviet soldiers [7].

The Polish side, not willing to change its internal policy, made attempts to establish trade and economic ties with Russia and resume the operation of a joint working group on controversial issues. However, the Russian side rejected Poland's proposal to resume the work of this group. The statement from the Russian side said that the resumption of the Group’s activities is possible only in the context of a general normalization of relations with Poland. [9].

The confrontation between the Russian and Polish leadership still continues and none of the parties makes gestures to restore normal relations. According to Russian officials, Poland is the culprit in the deterioration of relations, and it should be the first to show the initiative for normalization. And the Polish side considers it possible to return to normal relations only if Russia renounces its aggressive policy against Ukraine, withdraws its military formations from Donbass and Lugansk and returns Crimea to Ukraine. Russian officials at different levels continue to declare that the state interests are above all for Russia [3]. Thus, today Russian-Polish political relations have reached an impasse, the way out of which is not yet visible.

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